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For almost half a century, Alfred D. Chandler Jr. has enjoyed an en-viable reputation as the most influential business historian in the 
world. Chandlerian business history is a mainstay of the "new" institu-
tionalism that John Higham discerned over four decades ago in a justly 
admired survey of American historical writing; in addition, it has long 
been a cornerstone of the "organizational synthesis" that Louis Galam-
bos championed in three widely discussed essays.1 Even in history de-
partments that have shifted their primary focus from politics and eco-
nomics to society and culture, Chandler remains required reading.2 
Indeed, Chandler's The Visible Hand (1977) may well be the only book 
in business history that Ph.D. candidates in U.S. history feel an obliga-
tion to crib.3 Yet, there is one dimension of his scholarship that has thus 
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Professionalization: Central Themes of the Organizational Synthesis," Business History Re-
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far been mostly overlook~d. And that is its indebtedness to, and refine-
ment of, the· genre of historical writing that we cnstomarily label "pro-
gressive," a genre whose most prominent exemplars include Frederick 
Jackson Turner (1861-1932) and Charles A. Beard (1874-1948). Chan-
dler was not only a pillar of the "organizational· synthesis" that drew 
creatively on certain social theoretical insights of Max Weber and Tai- • 
cottParsons; he was also an heir to one of the most distinguished tradi-
tions of historical writing to have originated in the United States, a tra-
dition that has for over one hundred years inspired emulation in the 1 
United States and abroad. 
* * * 
That Chandler's progressive lineage has thus far gone largely un-
noticed is perhaps unsurprising.• Chandler had little interest in histori-
ography and, to the best of my knowledge, never identified himself as a 
progressive. In addition, he is sometimes lumped together-mistakenly, 
in my view-with the "consensus" historians of the 1950s, who rejected 
the economic interpretation of their progressive forbears and questioned 
the centrality of conflict in the American past. Chandler wrote more about 
conflict than is often supposed. Yet the conflicts that engaged him al-
most always involved economic interests-merchants versus manufac-
turers, engineerS versus financiers, managers versus investors-rather 
than social classes-women versns men, black versus white, rich versns 
poor. Chandler's priorities were different from those of many historians 
today. Yet they would have been familiar to Turner and Beard, who, for 
the most part, viewed the past through a similar lens. 
Chandler's progressivism shone forth in his abiding faith in educa-
tion, democracy, and planning. Like the great progressive leader Theo-
dore Roosevelt, whom Chandler very much admired and whose personal 
correspondence he helped to edit, Chandler believed that giant corpo-
rations could, and should, be obliged to contribute to the common good. 
It was, thus, entirely characteristic for Chandler, in an early essay, to fault 
Roosevelt's Progressive Party for being insufficiently progressive. Pro-
gressive Party leaders, Chandler observed, only pretended to be forward 
4For a rare exception; see William N. Parker, ''The Scale and Sc0pe of Alfred D. Chandler, 
Jr.," Journal of Economic History 51 (Dec.1991): 960. !'Perhaps some foreign observer of the 
American mind might point out to us," Parker observed, "that best of all, despite his span of 
years in the atmosphere of the Harvard School of Business Adminisll'ation, or perhaps be-
cause of it, Chandler remains an intellectual, albeit a very American one, showing in the 
whole thrust of his effort, the opinions, the intelligence, the natiorutl. concerns and values, in-
cluding even the bias toward technocracy, that characterized the best minds and spirits of the 
era of true Republican Progressivism." 
• 
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looking: In fact, they were nostalgic conservatives, "unimaginative in de-
veloping new doctrines and techniques necessary to insure democratic 
control of an indnstrial society."5 · 
Chandler's admiration for the progressive tradition was particu-
larly evident in his methodological assumptions. Like Turner and Beard, 
Chandler relied on quantitative data to frame creih"ble generalizations; 
like them, he rejected the time-honored convention that the historians' 
primary obligation was to chronicle "past politics•; and, like them, he 
was fascinated by the epochal late-nineteenth-century transformation 
that has come to be known as the "Second Industrial Revolntion.• For 
each scholar, history was as much a meditation on the present as a 
chronicle of the past. Chandler shared his progressive forbears' confi-
dence in stage models of economic development, and, in marked con-
trast to the proponents of the "consensus school" of the 1950s, he relied 
on an explanatory scheme that emphasized economic interests. Turn-
er's stage model highlighted the closing of the frontier in 1890; Beard's, 
the triumph of northern industrialists over southern planters in the 
American Civil War (1861-1865). Chandler's stsge model was tripartite. 
The first stage (1790-1840) featured the Euro-American settlement of 
the trans-Appalachian West; the second stage (1840-1870), the comple-
tion of nationwide transportation and communications networks; and 
the third stage (1880-1920 ), the emergence of the large-scale, vertically 
integrated industrial firm. For Chandler, like Turner and Beard, yet un-
like influential postwar historians such as Richard Hofstadter, history 
. did not hinge on the interplay of culture and personality. To be sure, 
Chandler was a more thoroughgoing institutionalist than Turner and 
Beard, and he wrote on a narrower range of topics. Even so, he never 
abandoned his forbears' se)lsitivity to the vagaries of geography and cul-
ture, or their faith in human betterment, a faith that remains at the core 
of the progressive appeal. 
While this essay is about Chandler rather than Turner and Beard, 
to avoid misunderstanding it is worth underscoring that Turner and 
Beard are themselves· easily misconstrued. For too many present-day 
historians, Turner is pigeonholed as an uncritical celebrant of the Euro-
American settlement of the trans-Appalachian West, while Beard is type-
cast as a cynical debunker of the supposedly high-minded motives of the 
men who drafted the federal Constitution. Such facile caricatures ignore 
the extent to which both Turner and Beard grappled with, and were in-
fluenced by, the economic transformations that Chandler regarded as 
5 Alfred D. Chandler Jr .1 ''The Origins of Progressive Leadership," in The Letters of Thea~ 
dore Roosevelt, ed. Eltirig E. Morison, John M. Blwn, .Alfred D. Chandler Jr., and Sylvia Rice 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1954), vo1. 8, 1462-65. 
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so consequential. 6 In addition, they exaggerate the preoccupation of 
Turner and Beard with conflict and minimize their fascination with tech-. 
nology. The social consequences of the recent "revolution" in industrial 
methods, Turner posited in 1910, were far·reaching. "The tremendous 
energies thus liberated at this center of industrial power in the United 
States," Turner observed, had "revolutionized methods of manufacture 
in general, and in many indirect ways profoundly influenced the life of 
the nation."7 Beard was, if anything, even more impressed with the.so-
cial consequences of technological change. Mass production, Beard re- • 
fleeted in 1927, was the "outstanding feature" of the present, imposing 
"correlative influences on American slants of thought, modes of living, 
manners, and aesthetic expression. "8 The "most fundamental fact" of the 
age, Beard proclaimed in the same year, was the alignment of "all thought, 
6My understanding of Turner and Beard builds on Ellen Fitzpatrick, History's Menwry: 
Writing America's Past, 1880-1980 (Cambridge, Mass., 2002), esp. 8, 53, and 97; Ernst A. 
Breisach, American Progressive History: An Experiment in Modernization ( Chicago,J.993), 
esp. ch. 9; and Ian Tyrrell, "Making NatiOns/Making States: American Historians in the Con-
text of Empire, H Jownal of American History 86 (Dec. 1999): ·1017-23. Each challenges in 
different ways the older, less nuanced, and, in certain respects, self-serving, characterization 
of Turner and Beard that Lee Benson.and Richard Hofstadter popularized in the 1960s and 
Peter Novick echoed in the 1980s. Lee Benson, Turner and Beard: American Historical 
Writing Reconsidered (Glencoe, ill., 1960); Richard Hofstadter, Progressive Historians: 
Turner, Beard, Parrington (Chicago, 1968); Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The 'Objectiv-· 
ity Question' and the American Historical Profession (cambridge, 1988). In so doing, they 
critique the conventional, whiggish narrative of twentieth-century U.S. historiography, in 
which the progressivism of Turner and Beard is challenged by the "consensus school" of Dan-
iel Boorstin, Richard Hofstadter, and Louis Hartz before being triumphantly supplanted by 
the neoprogressivism of the "new" historians of the 196bs. With few exceptions, the new his-
. torians exaggerate the progressives' emphasis on social conflict and downplay their engage-
ment with late-nineteenth-century industrialization. "In Progressive history," Breisach as-
tutely observed, "conflict is auxiliary to progress and not a force important in and by itself" 
(226n.26). 
7Frederick Jackson Turner, "Social Forces in American History" [1911], in Frontier and 
Section: Selected Essays of Frederick Jackson. Turner, ed. Ray Allen Billington (Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J., 1961), i55, 156. 
8Charles A. Beard and Mary R. Beard, The Rise of American Civilization (New York, 
1927), vol. 2, 713, While Charles and Mary Beard (Charles's wife) collaborated on virtually ev-
ery chapter of American Civilization, Charles was primarily responsible for the sections on 
politics and the economy, Mary for the sections on culture and society. Ellen Nore, Charles A. 
Beard: An Intellectual Biography (Carbondale, Ill., 1983), u2-13. Historians who are famil-
iar with the Beards' Rise of American Civilization only by reputation, and who assume that 
progressive historical writing is informed by a pervasive antibusiness bias, may be surprised 
to discover that it includes numerous vignettes of business leaders that look forward less to 
Matthew Josephson's Robber Barons (1934) than to Harold C. Llvesay's American Made: 
Shapers of the American Economy (1979, 2nd ed., 2007), an engaging collective portrait of 
various business leaders by one of Chandler's students. In 1938 the Beards' daughter, Mir-
iam, published a largely admiring History of the Business Man. If the Beards' Rise of Ameri-
can Civilization is taken as a proof text, there is little reason to suppose that either of Miri-
am's parents would have found fault with either the subject or the tone of their daughter's 
book, For a related discussion, yet a different conclusion, see Mary A. Yeager, "Mavericks and 
Mavens of Business History: M'Iriam Beard an,d Henrietta Larson," Enterprise and Society 2 
(Dec. 2001): 687-768. 
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all policies, and all actions" with the "convulsive pressures of technol-
ogy pouring through time, turning social orders into ever new kaleido-
scopic patterns."9 Such assertions seemed to Chandler self-evident even 
tho~gh, unlike Turner, c;randler wrote little about regionalism, ~bile, 
unlike Beard, he emphasized the symbiotic relationship of technologi-
cal creativity and organizational design.10 
Turner and Beard lived through the Second Industrial Revolnti~n· 
Ch_andler inter~reted ~t. For Chandler, the primary unit of analysis w~ 
~either the region, as it had been for Turner, nor economic interest, as 
it had been for Beard. Rather, it was the firm.11 These differences were 
significant. Yet they should not obscure the extent to which all three his-
torians shared certain assumptions about the rise of the United States 
"'.' '.'ll indu~al giant. Each harbored profound nrlsgivings about the "in-
VJS1ble hand of the market; each rejected the Brandeisian critique of big 
business as inherently inefficient; and each characterized certain indus-
tries as "natural monoPolies" that, for technological reasons were more-
or-less impervious to competition. Many historians toda;, of course, 
challenge at least one of these assumptions. In so doing, they quarrel 
not only with Chandler, but iilso with Turner and Beard.12 
* * * 
9Gharles A. Beard, ''Time, Technology, and the Creative Spirit in Political Science "Amer-
~can.Politica~ Science Review 21 (Feb. 1927): 5. Beard's flirtation with technological ~in­
ISm Is conspicuously underplayed in Benson's Turner and Beard and Hofstadter's Progres-
sive His,~orians. For a corrective, see Nore, Charles A. Beard, eh, g. Also useful is Cushing 
Strout. The Twentieth Century Enlightenment," American Political Science Review 49 
· (June 1955): 333-37: 
10Thoug~ Chandler alwitys disti~shed between technology and organization, there is 
m~ truth In !h~ common charge, which he always !lenied, that he was, at bottom, a techno-
logi;aJ deternuntst. See, ~~r example, Techoology and Culture 19 (July 1978): 572, "There 
are, Chandler o~serve~, pr~ound differences between modern managerial capitalism and 
modern m~nager1al so.cialisn:i 1n economic performance and activity, iI.I the distribution of in-
come, and in the quality of hfe, but an evaluation of these differences cannot be made until 
the operation~! ~ract~tics of capit.alism and socialism are more :Precisely defined, and 
the te~ol?gical nnperatives of mass production and mass distribution in urban, industrial 
mass societies are more carefully sorted out." 
"~nd.ler, "Organizational Capabilities and the Economic Histocy of the Industrial En-
terp~ise," Jour~al.ofJ!conomic Perspectives 6(Summer1992): 79-100. 
, . Another sumlanty ~etween Chandler, Turner, and Beard was their common character~ 
iza~~n of the early ~:ncan. economy. Like Turner and Beard, yet unlike the proponents of 
!he market revolution. th~is tha~ Charles Si:Jiers popularized in the 1990s, Chandler took 
It for granted that cap1ta11sm arnved on the first ships, and that the nineteenth-century 
economy evolved not from a subsistence-based stage to a market-based stage, but, rather 
from a .market e7ono':11y that was oriented primarily toward Europe to a market eooD.omy thai 
was onented pnmarily toward the trans-Appalachian hinterland. In this transition cotton 
plantations ~Jayed .a pivotal role. Cotton planters, in Chandler's view, had little ince~tive to 
be self~suffici~nt, smce they could make far more money selling cotton in overseas markets 
th~ by growmg the foodstuffs they needed to feed their slaves, The coming of the railroad 
~h1fted the gi.:ographic orientation of this market-from North-South to East-West-but not 
1ts market-onented character. Chandler, The Visible Hand, 516-17n.570. 
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Turner's influence o:µ Chandler was pervasive and enduring. Though 
Chandler never met Turner-Turner died in 1932, when Chandler was 
fourteen-Chandler wrote his Ph.D. dissertation at Harvard in the same 
history department in which Turner had long taught under the supervi-
sion of one ofTijmer's most loyal.disciples, the western historian Fred-
erick Merk. Merk introduced Chandler both to Turner's celebrated "fron1 
tier thesis" and to historical geography; the latter was a topic that would 
fascinate Chandler throughout his life.13 Chandler wholeheartedly em- · 
braced Turner's contention that westward expansion was a critical fac-
tor in American economic development. For Turner, the rapid settlement 
of the trans-Appalachian West beginning around 1815 hastened the 
emergence of a new kind of civilization that was defined, above all, by 
the nnprecedented availability of cheap land. So long as land was abun-
dant, large-scale enterprise would remain rare. To buttress this point, 
Turner cited approvingly a U.S. treasury secretary who had predieted in 
1827that the scattering of a "thin" population over a huge territorial ex-
panse would inevitably retard rather than accelerate the "creation of yap-
ital."14 Chandler concurred. Westward expansion, Chandler contended 
in a justly praised and oft-reprinted essay that he published in 1959, 
fumished the "primary impetus" for bnsiness innovation in the period 
before 1840.15 In.effect, the rise of the large-scale industrial firm had 
been slowed by the enormous size of the North American interior, and, 
in particular, by the spatial dispersion of the market. To a much greater 
extent than in, say, Great Britain, geography constrained.16 
The very metaphors Chandler relied on to characterize economic 
development in the· pre-1840 period had an unmistakably Turnerian 
cast. Consider, for example, Chandler's use of the term 11pioneer." Chan-
dler'.s pioneers, like Turner's1 flourished in a relatively early stage of eco-
nomic development. Turner's pioneers settled the frontier; Chandler's 
commercialized new products. For Turner, the pioneering stage of Amer-
ican economic development ended with the disappearance of a moving 
13Thomas K. McCraw, ''The Intellectual Odyssey of Alfred D. Chandler, Jr.," in The Es~ 
sential Alf1'ed Chandler: Essays Toward a Historical Theory of Big Business, ed. McCraw 
(Boston. t9BB), 19-20. Chandler's Turnerianism is particularly evident in the introduction 
he prepared for a documentary collection on fiscal policy during the presi~ency of Andrew 
Jackson (1829-1837): "Jacksonian Democracy and the Bank War: 'The Crisis of 1830-1834, ij 
inMqjor Crises in American H"tsttJry: Documentary Problems, 1689-1861, 2 vols., ed. Leon-
ard W. Levy and MEirrill D. Peterson (New York, 1962), vol 1, 334-42, 400. 
· 14Turner, "Social Forces," lfi8. 
15 
.Alfred D. Chandler Jr., "The Beginnings of 'Big Business' in American Industry" [1959]1 
in The Essential Alfred Chandler, ed. McCraw, 47, 48. Though Chandler altered his views on 
various subjects during his long publishing career, he was reme,rkably consistent in his char-
acterization of the main contours of American economic development. For this reason, in 
glossing his argument, I have drawn freely not only on his Visible Hand, but also on essays 
that he published before and after its appearance in 1977-
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frontier around 1890. For Chandler, pioneering business leaders gave 
way to entrepreneurial first movers who orchestrated the all-important 
three-pronged investment in mannfactoring, ·marketing, and manage-
ment.17 To highlight this contrast, Chandler distinguished between pio-
neers and "innovators" -a business-school buzzword that he used de-
liberately, and with care. Pioneers, in Chandler's view, rarely made the 
requisite investment in organizational capabilities necessary for genu-
ine innovation.18 
While geography constrained. it also empowered. For Turner, the 
logistical challenge of settling a vast continent in an astonishingly brief 
· period of time created the social preconditions for American democ-
racy. For Chandler, it emboldened railroad promoters to build the first 
trans-Appalachian railroads, a ventore destined to have as "great an im-
pa:.ct1' on the American economy as "any innovation has had at any time 
in American history.'"• The facilities that the railroad provided for fast, 
high-volume, all-weather transportation, in turn, created the large-scale 
market that hastened the emergence of the large-scale industrial firm. 
Industrial firms became large scale not only, or even primarily, because 
of the capital intensity of their production facilities, but also, and even 
more critically, ·because of the geographic extent of their distribution 
networks. Distribution networks, in torn, loomed large because of the 
scattering of the American people that had been hastened by westward 
expansion. 
Westward expansion shaped not only the timing of the emergence 
of the industrial firm, but also its character. The settlement of the trans-
Appalachian West bad been so recent, Chandler explained, that relatively 
few mannfactorers had had the opportunity to become established, while 
the independent wholesalers upon whom they might otherwise have re-
lied were disproportionately concentrated north of the Potomac and east · 
of the Ohio. As a consequence, and in contrast to Britain and France, 
wonld-be first movers had little trouble buying out potential rivals if the 
price was right, and they fonnd it necessary to build their own whole-
sale networks to market their wares. 20 · 
* * * 
11 Alfred D. Chandler Jr., "Learning and Technological Change: The Perspective from 
Business History," in Learning and Techrwlogical Change, ed. Ross 1'homson (New York, 
1993), 27. 
18 Alfred D. Chandler Jr., Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Cain-
bridge, Mass., 19~0), 735. Other Turnerian metaphors tliat Chandler adopted included ':'evo-
lution" and "seedbed" -a variant of the Tnmerian "seed-plot." 
19 Journal of Economic History 29 (Sept. 1969): 563. 
20 Alfred D. Chandler Jr., ".The Coming of Big Business," in The Comparative Approach 
to American History, ed. C. Vann Woodward (New York, 1968), 233-34. 
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Beard does not apperu; in the index to The Visible Hand; neither, 
for that matter, does Turner.21 Yet no U.S. historian of Chandler's gen-
eration could ignore Beard's provocative thesis, in his Economic Inter-
pretation of the Constitution of the United States (1913), that the fed-
eral Constitution jmd beeu shaped by the economic interests of its 
framers, or, for that matter, the adoption by Charles and Mary Beard, 
in their coauthored Rise of American Civilization (1927), of Thorstein 
Veblen's celebrated duality between reactionary financiers and progres-
sive engineers.22 Chandler's indebtedness to Beard is less direct than his 
indebtedness to Turner. Yet it was no less fundamental. Chandler wres-
tled with Beard's Economic Interpretation in a course that he taught at 
MIT early in his career, and he employed the financier-engineer duality 
in several early'(lublications. For Chandler, Beard's hard-headed materi-
alism was far more congenial than the thinly veiled social-psychological 
detel'Il)inism of the consensus historians who denounced Beard so em-
phatically in the 1950s. 
Chandler's familiarity with Beardian themes was, in a certain sense, 
a product of their shared intellectual milieu. Unlike Beard, Chandler had 
not, of conrse, grown up in the nineteenth century. Yet Chandler had been 
trained as an economic historian of this period, and was, thus, steeped 
in interest-based explanatory schemes and the financier-engineer du-
ality, since both were widely discussed not only by specialists in this 
field, but also in the nineteenth-century business press. Chandler knew 
these press accounts especially well, having written his dissertation on 
the nineteenth-century business analyst Henry Varnum Poor, who, as it 
happens, was also Chandler's own great-grandfather. ·Poor was a keen 
student of economic interests-like many nineteenth-cen):nry social the-
21 Economic and business historians have oddly neglected the Beards' contribution to the 
field. Neither Charles nor Mary Beard is included, for example, in the list of forty-four "first 
generation" economic and business historians that Ar_thm H. Col~ profiled in. The Birth of~ 
New Social Science Discipline: Achievements of the First Generation of American Economtc 
and Business Historians-1893-1974 (NewYork.1974). Cole did briefly discuss Charles Beard 
in his preface, yet, Somewhat oddly, he limited his legacy to ~po~tical economists~ rather than 
historians. Interestingly, Cole acknowledged Miriam Beards H~tory of th~ Bu51._ness Man as. 
the "first domestic survey" of the subject (p. 3), though Cole mistakenly listed its author. as 
Mary rather than Miriam (p. 3). Among the historians Cole pro~led we~ Turner, Frederick 
Merk, Henrietta M. Larson, and Thomas C. Cochran. Chandler himself did not make the cut, 
presumably be'cause Cole did not consider him a member of the "first generation.", 
:i2 one way to gain insight into the intellectual influences that shaped Chandlers develop-
ment as a historian is to survey the books that he owned, a task that is facilitat~d by h!8 gift of 
his personal library to Baker Library at Harvard Business School. Chandler's hbraiy m~udes 
many canonical works in American history, including Beard's Economic InterpretatiDn, as 
well as a smattering of titles on organizational sociology and business management (though 
- none by Talcott Parsons or Max Weber), and virtually nothing on economics. Though Chan-
dler's library included neither Turner's collected essays nor either of his books, it did contain 
a first edition of Frederick L. Paxson's resolutelyTurrierian History of the Frontier (1924). 
' 
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orists, he found it hard to believe that individuals could be motivated to 
work hard in a large organization if they were paid a regular salary-and 
he routinely denounced financiers such as Jay Gould in his voluminous 
writings on railroad finance.23 
Chandler's neo-Beardianism was particularly evident in several early 
publications that grew out of his dissertation-in which, not surprisingly, 
he adopted Poor's financier-engineer duality to characterize early rail-
road managers.24 While Chandler deployed this duality with increasing 
subtlety in later publications, he never abandoned it altogether. Engi-
ne~rs morphed into engineer-managers and, eventually1 into managers, 
while financiers became venture capitalists aud investment bankers.25 
That managers trimnphed was, for Chandler, reassuring. This was be-
cause Chandler credited managers with having longer time horizons 
than investors, on the grounds that they had a vested interest in their 
own careers, which were closely linked to the fortunes of the firms that 
they oversaw.26 No investor; Chandler believed-not Jay Gould, and not 
even J. P. Morgan-played a role in business administration that was in 
any way comparable to visionary managers such as General Motors' Al-
fred P. Sloan. 
Chandler's anti-investor bias was particularly evident in his treat-
ment of Gould, the most notorious financier in American history. Like 
Poor, Chandler regarded Gould as a mere manipulator of financial mar-
kets who, unlike railroad managers, had little interest in, or talent for, 
building enduring institutions. Though Chandler did his best to remain 
23 Alfred D. Chandler Jr., Henry Varnum Poor: Business Editor, Analyst, and Reformer 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1956), chs. 7, 11. Poor's antifinancialism was so pronounced that it would 
not be in the least surprising should some intrepid historian discover documentary proof that 
it was Poor himself-that is, Chandler's own great-gfandfather-who first coined the damn-
ing epithet "robbei: baron~ to ~haracterize a financially unscrupulous business leader. The 
concept ("German barons"), though not the phrase itself, can be found in aNew York Times 
editorial on 9 February 1859. While Poor almost certliinly did not write this editorial, he did 
occasionally write editorials in the Times on economic topics. I am grateful to T. J. stiles for 
bringing this Times editorial to my attention, and for putting it into the context of financial 
journalism of the 1850s. . . 
24Chandler, "The Railroads: Pioneers in Modern Corporate Management" [1965], in The 
Essential Alfred Chandler, ed. McCraw, ~79-201. 
25While Chandler often praised the investment necessary to sustain large-scale enterprise, 
he rarely praised investors, and he was particularly hard on short-term investors like Gouldi 
whom he tended 1D dismiss, as had his great-grandfather before him, as financial buccaneers. 
If anything, Chandler's anti-investor bias grew more pronounced overtime. "We·are going 
to pay a price for shareholder capitalism," Chandler declared in an interview in 1991: "Among 
the 50 largest chemical companies in the world, the only ones that pay over 10 percent divi-
dends are the Americans, and they pay l5 percent. If you really believe-this i.s where I get 
upset-that the function of the firm is to give dividends to shareholders, we're going to end 
up worse than Britain. Intel has never declared a dividend and it has put a billion dollars back 
in1D the business. That's the way to do it." Cited in Parker, "Scale and Scope," 961. 
26 Chandler, "Beginnings of 'Big Business,"' 194· 
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nonjudgmental, his anti-investor bias was unmistakable. Chandler's 
Gould was not, like Maury Klein's, a talented organization builder; in-
~tead, in his opinion, Gould was nothing more than an opportunist who · 
madvertently hastened economic changes that he had in no way willed. •7 
Te~gly, Chancller ignored altogether Gould's then novel, yet today con-
ventional, metl:\od of valuing corporate securities on the basis of futur<\ 
e~rnings power rather than sunk costs. The most Chandler could bring 
himself to credit Gould with was the launching of a pair of speculative 
raids on railroad securities that prompted railroad managers in self-
defense to build huge, self-contained, and-at least initially-inefficient 
systems. Gould's first raid led the Pennsylvania Railroad to create the 
nation's first "megacorp," a term that Chandler did not intend as a com-
pliment. His second raid obliged the Pennsylvania's rivals to follow its 
lead. The resulting "system-building," ail Chandler termed it-a phrase 
that, like "megacorp," he intended to be pejorative-was in Chandler's 
view highly wasteful and led inexorably to the widespread bankruptcy 
of several leading railroads in the 1890s. Here, once again, Chandler 
echoed Poor.•• 
Chandler's skepticism regarding investors informed his critique of 
Forrest McDonald's admiring biography of the early-twentieth-century 
utilities magnate Samuel Insull. Vindictive bankers, McDonald con-
tended, orchestrated Insu!l's financial ruin. Chandler demurred. Mc-
Donald's conclusion, Chandler observed, would have been more "be-
lievable" had McDonald focused less on bankers and more on the Great 
Depression and the "inherent structure" of utility holding companies. 
"After all," .Chandler reasoned, "in the spring of 1932 the bankers had a 
great deal more to think about than breaking Insull." Many historians, 
Chandler added, held a naive view of the "realities of business"; as a 
consequence, a business biographer had a "particular responsibility" to 
"stick to the facts" and refrain from crediting bankers with powers they 
did not possess."' 
In his treatment of legal topics, which was limited and perfunctory, 
Chandler also echoed a familiar Beardian theme. Llke Beard, and, for 
that matter, like many progressives, including Theodore Roosevelt, clian-
dler regarded the judiciary with a skepticism that often bordered on 
contempt. A case in point was Chandler's implicit condemnation of the 
refusal oflate-nineteenth-centmy courts to enforce the market-sharing 
27Maury Klein, Life and Legend of Jay Gould (NewYork, 1986), · 
28 Chandler, The Visible Hand, 88, 147-48, 154 See a1so Chandler, "Jay Gould and the 
Coming of Railroad Consolidation," in Management Past and Present: A Casebook on the 
History of American Business, ed. Chandler, Richard S. Tedlow, ai:id Thomas K. McCraw 
(Cinclnnatl, 1996), 2-4i, 45, 46, 48. _ 
29 MissisSl"ppi Valley Historical Relliew 50 (June 19tj~; 146-47. 
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agreements, known as "pools," that railroad managers had negotiated 
to limit competition .. Beard might have explained this obstructionism 
by pointing to the judges' economic self-interest. Chandler, in contrast, 
attributed it to the judges' values, and, in particular, to their principled 
hostility to special privilege that was a legacy of Jacksonian antimonop-
olism. The catalyst, in short, was neither technology nor markets, but 
culture,3° 
Had the railroads "captured" the courts-or, to put it differently, had 
judges scrupulously honored the tenets of '1aissez-falre" -one might 
have predicted that judges would enforce the pools that railroad manag-
ers devised. A pool, after all, was a contract, an agreement that property· 
minded laissez-faire judges intent upon upholding the railroads' sup-
posed freedom of contract might have been expected to sustain. Yet 
here lay a paradox: German judges routinely enforced railroad pools; 
U.S. judges did not. To underscore this point, Chandler emphasized the 
repeated failure of the Prussian-trained railroad engineer Albert Fink 
to persuade the U.S. Congress to legalize pooling. Not only did Fiulcfail to 
legalize pooling; but Congress, in 1887, went so far as to declare rail-
road pools illegal. As a consequence, railroad managers-and, before . 
long, the managers of industrial firms-found themselves obliged to build 
huge, self-sustaining systems far larger than any comparable organiza-
tions in Europe. Had they uot, they might well have been driven into 
bankruptcy by the impossibility of recovering their investments. This 
was because industrial firms, like railroads, had such high fixed costs 
that their managers had a compelling financial incentive.to stay in busi-
ness, even if they lost money on ev:ery single transaction. 31 
Chandler's frustration with the judiciary informed his analysis of 
the rise, after the Second World War, of a new kind of corporation that 
would come to be known as a "conglomerate." Chandler regarded con-
glomerates as products not of technology and economics but, rather, of 
politics and culture. Managers, Chandler explained, feared that, if they 
so Chandler The Visible Hand, i35-36, 148-51, 160. "Antitrust legislation,'" Chandler ob-
served, "retlect~d a powerful bias of Americans against special privilege, which had expressed 
itself earlier in the controversy over the Bank of the United States during the Jacksonian pe-
riod. In Europe, governmental support of special class and family interests was more accept-
able." Chandler, "Coming of Big Business,"· 234. 
3111te inability of railroad leaders to persuade judges to sanction pooling, Chandler be-
lieved, :furnished compelling evidence that big business did not dominate the regulatory pro-
cess, as, for.example, Gabriel Kolko had contended in Railroads and Regulation, 1877:-1916 
(Princeton 1965), uif theAmerican cartels had had some kind of legal support or sanction by 
the ~ent," Chandler observed, "as was true of those in continental Europe, the giant 
corporation would surely have been slower in coming." Chandler, "Coming of Big Business," 
226. Or to put it somewhat differently, the most distinctive feature of the U.S. regulatory re-
gime was not the absence of "big government" but the presence of an antimonopoly reguta-· 
tory reginle. 
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in~a~ed their !inn's market share, they might b~:!p ·.·.·· .. 
stra1mng trade under a federal law, known as the ShermanA 
scribed certain kinds of uncompetitive behavior. As a consequence:• 
~schewe~ econol.1'ies ?f scale and scope in favor of unrelated diver~iftc~-.>: 
lion, which was•less likely to land them in court. Chandler's dislike for 
conglomerates was visceral, and may come as a surprise to historians 
":ho ?5sume, wrongly, that he was an uncritical admirer of corporate 
giantism. In fact, Chandler consistently derided self-aggrandizing corpo-
rate mo.guls .like Henry Ford as mere '1empire builders"; and, in contrast ·'-
to the histonan of technology Thomas P. Hughes, he routinely disparaged 
system-building as wasteful, even when it had originated as a defensive 
strategy to forestall a potentially devastating competitive assault. 
* * * 
Turner and Beard endorsed Theodore Roosevelfs conviction that 
the national govermnent should play an increasingly prominent role in 
the regulation of big business. So, too, did Chandler. In addition to de-
fending railroad pooling, Chandler praised the New Deal, endorsed Keyn-
sian economics, and admired the Federal Reserve for restraining Wall 
. Street bankers-whom, in a characteristic jibe, Chandler fanlted for hav-
ing funded American business at a "sizable profit'.' and at a" cost of chronic 
financial and economic instability.""" 
While Chandler did not believe that historians had any special ex-
pertise in the fonnulation of public policy, he aspired to-provide a his-
torical perspective on the issues of the day. 33 In a historical overview of 
U.S. energy policy that he published in 1980, for example, Chandler en-
visioned a "Third Industrial Revolution," in which corporations, govern-
ment agencies, and universities joined together t.o rid the world of its 
"possibly fatal" dependence on fossil fuel. Renewable energy, Chandler 
reflected, had powered the American economy before 1&jo. Might it not 
do so once again in the future? Here, as in so many other realms, the 
fundamental challenge was not technological but organizational. What 
institutional arrangements, Chandler speculated, would best smooth the 
transition from an economy based on fossil fuel to an economy that ran 
32 Alfred D. Chandler Jr., "The Depression Crisis and the Emergence of the Welfare State 
1932-1935," in Major Crises in American History: Documentary Problems, 1865-1953: 
2 vols., ed. .. Merrill J?. Peterson and,,Leonard W. Levy (New York, 1962), vol 2, 330-38, 387; 
Chandler, Jackson1an Democracy, 334-42, 400, quotation on p. 400. 
33 Alfred D. ~andler Jr., "The Role of Business in the United States: A Historical Survey," 
Daedalus 98 .(Winter 1969): 40. "To suggest how and in what ways the managers will re-
s?Ond to the current challenges is," Chandler observed, "fortunately, not the task of the histo-
nan. Such analyses are properly left to social scientists and businessmen" (p. 40). 
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on water, wind, and sun-as the U.S. economy had done in the period 
before the "First Industrial Revolution"?34 
Chandler's thought experiment highlighted his abiding faith in the 
human spirit. Especially in his later years, Chandler became fascinated 
by social capital, and, in particular, by the "virtuous stratei;ies" and 
. ''paths of learning" by which certain finns, industries, and nations re-
maine!l. innovative over the long haul. People, Cba.ndler hypothesized 
in an essay that he published in 2000, were rapidly supplanting non-
renewable resources as the "fuel" of the economy. Iii the nineteenth cen-
tury, coal had powered the railroad; in the twenty-first, the computer 
was fueled not only by electricity, but also, and in a more fundamental 
sense, by software, a renewable resource that originated not in nature, 
but in the mind. 35 
Chandler's confidence in the ''visible hand" of planning was a recur-
rent theme of his final two books: Shaping the Industrial Century (2005) 
and Inventing the Electronic Century (2001). In these books, Chandler 
undertook a global history of the leading finns in four twentieth-century 
high-tech ind\!Stries-chemicals, pharmaceuticals, computers, and con-
sumer electronics. Why, Chandler asked, did certain firms succeed while · 
others failed? To answer this question, Chaudler looked not only to orga-· 
nizational dynamics, but also to what Beard might have called political 
economy. And, in particular, Chandler repeatedly castigated American 
lawmakers for what he regarded as an ultimately self-defeating com-
mitment to competition. 36 
Chandler's frustration with American 13.wmakers led him in his 
final years to reconsider the American exceptionalism that he had im-
plicitly endorsed in Visible Hand. The origins of the Second Industrial 
Revolution, Chandler now explained, lay not in the United States but in 
Europe. In advancing this claim, Chandler challenged not only Beard's 
flattering assessment of American technological prowess-an assessment 
that would later be relined by the historian of technology Thomas P. 
34 Alfred D. Chandler Jr., "Industrial Revolutions and Institutional Arrangements," Bulle-
tin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 33 (May i980): 33, 48. Contrary to what 
seems to be a widespread impression, Chandler did not, like Lewis Mumford, assign labels to 
periods of American economic history based on changing energy sources. In fact, Chandler 
regarded the commercialization of anthracite coal in the 1840s as largely fortuitous and, as 
he grew older, deemphasized the significance of electric power. 
35 Alfred D. Chandler Jr. and James W. Cortada, "The Information Age: Contilluities and 
Differences," in A 1\(atton Traneformed by Information: How Informatiqn haS Shaped the 
United Stat~ from Colonial Ti.mes to the Present, ed. Chall.dler and Cortada (New York, 
2000), 290. 
36 Alfred D. Chandler Jr., Shaping the Industrial Century: The Remarkable Story of the 
Evolution of the Modern Chemical and Phannaceutical Industries (Cambridge, Mass., 
2005); Chandler, Inventing the Electronic Century: The Epic Story of COnsumer Electronics 
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Hughes-but also Turner's American-centric geographic determinism. 
In tbe firutl decades of tbe nineteenth century, Turner had ridiculed tbe 
"germ" theory of his graduate-school mentor Herbert Baxter Adams, 
who had traced the origins of American institutions to tbe forests of 
Germany. In tbe opening decade of tbe twenty-first century, Chandler 
located the origins of modernity not in Turner's beloved Wisconsin for-
ests, but, rather, in tbe planning departments of tbe German chemical 
and electrical firms Bayer and Siemens & Halske on the banks of tbe 
Rhine.37 
Chancller's cosmopolitanism set him apart from most of his peers 
among American economic historians and highlighted an additional 
affinity between him and bis progressive forebears. Thongh Turner and 
Beard are often criticized as American exceptionalists, in fact, like tbe 
most ambitious of their peers, tbey aspired to write a "universal" his-
tory that transcended national boundaries.38 So, too, did Chancller. By 
asking big questions, following wherever they took bim, and refusing to 
confine himself to a particular place or time, Chancller laid the foun-
dations for a new history for a new age-a history in which the "visible 
hand" of planning had the potential not only to enrich nations, but also 
to hasten the global economic development that' an earlier generation 
of reformers would have called progress. 
37 Alfred D. Chandler Jr., "How High Technology Industries Transformed Work arld Life 
Worldwide from the lBBos to the 1990s," Capitalism and Society 1, no. 2 (2006): 4-6. In this 
essay, the last Chandler published in his lifetime, he politely but pointedly faulted several 
prominent eolleagues for their failure to locate the United States in a sufficiently global con-
text: (pp. 52-54). For a ringing endorsement' of Chandler's critique, see Richard Sylla, "Chan-
dler on Iligh Technology Industries from the tBBos to the i99os: A Comment," Capitalism 
and Society 1, no. 2 (2006): 3-4 . 
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